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ABSTRACT
We recently published an article in the New England Journal of Medicine
describing a crisis in cognitive testing, as doctors and medical researchers
increasingly face copyright claims in sets of questions used for testing mental
state. We encouraged the creation of a cultural norm in medicine, in which
medical researchers would ensure continued availability of their tests through
open source licensing for any copyrights that might exist.
In this piece, we consider the legal side of the question. Although copyrights
are being copiously asserted in medical testing, are those rights valid, and should
they be upheld? The legal precedents in this area are anything but clear, and the
courts are divided in the few analogous circumstances that have arisen.
We examine analogies in standardized testing, computer compilations and
baseball pitching forms to consider the marvelous question of how to
conceptualize a process—which is the purview of patent law—when that process
consists of words—which are the purview of copyright law. We also look from an
economics perspective at the issue of investment and value creation in the
development of de facto standards.
Legal scholars are so often in the position of looking backwards, teasing out
solutions to problems that have developed within a doctrinal or theoretical area.
Rarely does one have the opportunity to affect the course of events before
problems become so deeply entrenched that they are intractable. This is such a
moment, and the legal and medical fields should take advantage of the
opportunities presented.

* Robin Feldman, Professor of Law and Director, The Institute for Innovation Law,
University of California Hastings College of the Law.
* John Newman, MD, PhD, Research Fellow, Division of Geriatrics, University of
California San Francisco. We wish to thank William Casey, Thomas Field, Peter Gigante, C.
Bree Johnston, Pamela Samuelson, Robert Walker, and Linda Weir.
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INTRODUCTION
In December of 2011, we published an article in the New England Journal
of Medicine describing the current crisis in cognitive testing.1 Doctors and
medical researchers are scrambling to adapt to the recent assertion of
copyrights in a popular screening method that has been used for decades to
measure cognitive impairment. Although the assertion of this particular set of
rights is relatively new, doctors are increasingly facing copyright claims in a
variety of tests, including those for depression and for pain.2
In the New England Journal article, we tried to encourage the creation of a
cultural norm in the field of medicine, in which medical researchers would
ensure continued availability of their tests through appropriate open access
licensing for any copyrights that might exist.3 In this companion piece, we
consider the legal side of the question. Although copyrights in medical testing
are being asserted frequently, are those rights valid, and should they be upheld
in whatever courts eventually hear the issue? The legal precedents in this area
are anything but clear, and the courts are divided in the few analogous
circumstances that have arisen. In the article below, we examine analogies in
standardized testing, computer compilations and baseball pitching forms to
build a theoretical framework for the marvelous question of how to
conceptualize a process—which is the purview of patent law—when that
process consists of words—which are the purview of copyright law. In
addition, we look from an economics perspective at the issue of investment and
value creation in the development of de facto standards, and the implications

1. John Newman & Robin Feldman, Copyright and Open Access at the Bedside, 365
NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 2449 (Dec. 29, 2011). Although the New England Journal of Medicine
accepts only two author names, C. Bree Johnston was an essential author of that article, as
well as this one.
2. Appendix “A” contains a chart of mental state tools for which some form of
copyright has been asserted.
3. With open source licensing as a general matter, others are free to copy and use the
work, as long as any improvements created are made as freely available as the original work.
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for enforcement of copyright.
As fascinating as the theoretical challenges may be, the question of
copyright in medical testing has immediate, practical ramifications. Given the
uncertain legal terrain, doctors and researchers are quietly acquiescing to the
demands of those asserting copyright in medical tests, for fear of becoming
entwined in lengthy and expensive legal proceedings that could result in a
costly judgment. Such fear could easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy if it
prompts the creation of an industry norm for licensing medical tests. Courts
and legislators have been known to defer to industry custom, even when they
harbor some doubts about the wisdom of the underlying logic.4
Legal scholars are so often in the position of looking backwards, teasing
out solutions to problems that have developed within a doctrinal or theoretical
area. Rarely does one have the opportunity to affect the course of events before
problems become so deeply entrenched that they are intractable. This is such a
moment, and the legal and medical fields should take advantage of the
opportunities presented.
I.

THE CRISIS IN COGNITIVE TESTING

The current scramble in the field of cognitive testing relates to the MiniMental State Examination (“MMSE”), which is a brief, 30-point questionnaire
used to assess cognitive function. It is widely used to screen for cognitive
impairment in elderly patients, follow the progress and severity of dementia,
assess the cognitive impact of an injury, stroke, psychiatric illness, and to
provide a “standard” measure of cognition in research studies. The MMSE test
includes simple questions and problems concerning orientation in time and
4. For examples of courts deferring to industry custom despite underlying concerns,
see Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002)
(“[C]ourts must be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of
the inventing community.”); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., concurring) (“The settled expectations of the biotechnology
industry—not to mention the thousands of issued patents—cannot be taken lightly and
deserve deference.”); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“[A] determination of whether the limitation [of a patent claim] is sufficiently
definite is highly dependent on context (e.g., the disclosure in the specification and the
knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art area).”) (internal citations
omitted). For literature discussing the logic of acceding to industry custom, see Gideon
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285 (2008) (arguing
that courts’ reliance on industry custom chills innovation); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L. J. 882 (2007) (arguing that risk
aversion causes over-licensing, which in turn creates “doctrinal feedback” and a subsequent
expansion of intellectual property rights); Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of
Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007) (arguing that reliance on
custom and “best practices” in intellectual property law leads to expansion of owners’ rights
at expense of users). Cf. John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) (arguing that uncertainty in
legal standards leads to over-compliance by economic actors who modify their behavior
beyond what is socially optimal.)
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place, remembering a list of words, attention (spelling a word backwards),
language use and comprehension (writing a sentence, following a command),
and basic motor skills.5 The MMSE was first published in 1975 in a scholarly
article written by Marshal F. Folstein, Susan Folstein, and Paul R. McHugh.6
While the MMSE was included in the journal as an appendix, the authors
retained their putative copyright interests in the test.
As we have noted, the Mini-Mental State Exam was widely and freely
distributed for decades. With its brevity and simplicity, the Mini-Mental State
Exam became the most widely used, and widely studied, bedside cognitive test
in the United States.7 For twenty-five years the test was copied and distributed
innumerable times in every media available, finding its way into every geriatric
syllabus and pocket guide, as well as across information websites and the
internal websites of individual institutions. Its use for the evaluation of
cognitive impairment became the standard of care. The exam was memorized
by countless exhausted residents and medical students, who could probably
recite the test better than their own names, and was administered to myriad
patients over the years. The widespread use of the particular test added to its
value and reinforced its use. Researchers working in different settings and
different time periods could compare and evaluate results more easily. Doctors
moving from patient to patient or hospital to hospital had an easy point of
reference for comparing the status of patients. To our knowledge, the authors
made no attempts to assert copyright against these uses across the decades.
All this began to change in 2000, when the authors transferred copyright of
the MMSE to MiniMental LLC, a Massachusetts corporation founded by the
authors. MiniMental registered the transfer with the U.S. Copyright Office.8 In
March 2001, MiniMental entered into an agreement with Psychological
Assessment Resources (“PAR”) granting PAR the exclusive rights to publish
and license all intellectual property rights to the MMSE in all media and
languages across the world.9 In February 2010, PAR released a second edition
of the MMSE. In addition to selling an official licensed version of the MMSE
for $1.23 a test, PAR began to enforce its exclusive right to distribute the
MMSE.10 As a result of PAR’s enforcement of its exclusive license, the
5. Marshal F. Folstein, Susan Folstein, & Paul R. McHugh, “Mini-Mental State”: A
Practical Method for Grading the Cognitive State of Patients for the Clinician, 12 J.
PSYCHOL. RES. 189-198 (1975).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Shulman, et. al, IPA Survey of Brief Cognitive Screening Instruments, 18
INT’L PSYCHOGERIATRICS 281, 288 (2006) (survey reporting that the Mini-Mental State
Exam “is the test that is most widely recognized and is considered a well-known standard
benchmark. Everyone can relate to a score on the MMSE because of its widespread use and
familiarity. It has become the lingua franca of cognitive screening.”)
8. U.S. Copyright Office Registration No. TX0005228282 (June 8, 2000).
9. U.S. Copyright Office Registration No. TX0007369373 (Nov. 23, 2010).
10. For example, PAR asked UpToDate to remove the MMSE from its website. See
MMSE Copyright Frequently Asked Questions, 1-3 (2006), http://www.pbm.va.gov/
Clinical%20Guidance/FAQ%20SHEETS/MMSE%20Copyright%20FAQ.pdf (last visited
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MMSE has disappeared from the latest editions of medical textbooks, pocket
guides and clinical toolkits.11
The latest chapter in the saga of the Mini-Mental State Exam involved the
take down of an alternative cognitive assessment tool, the Sweet 16. The Sweet
16 was designed to be faster to administer than the MMSE, with less
educational bias and similar test characteristics to the MMSE. The authors
noted in their article that “a number of cognitive assessment instruments,
including the MMSE, are copyrighted and now have restrictions or fees
associated with their use,” and that in response, “the Sweet 16 is open access,
whereas the MMSE and the MMSE-2 are restricted by copyright.”12
The publication of the Sweet 16 in March 2011 was greeted with fanfare in
the medical field and even in popular media.13 As the authors promised in the
article, the instrument was made freely available for download on their website
with very permissive licensing terms for clinical and academic use. Apparently,
however, the owners of the MMSE were less enthusiastic about the new
competition. Shortly after publication, the test was removed from the authors’
website (hospitalelderlifeprogram.com), with the notice that, “In response to
requests from Psychological Assessment Resources (PAR), Inc., we are
removing the Sweet 16 from our website.”14 Although neither PAR nor the
Sweet 16 authors have commented in public, PAR’s request probably relates to
perceived similarities between the Sweet 16 and its own MMSE variants.15
The saga of the Mini-Mental State Exam has cast a shadow that extends
over many tools in daily clinical use, from cognitive screening and clinical tests
to prognostic indices. Although the Mini-Mental State Exam is the most public
and widespread example of copyright enforcement to date, PAR is not alone in
asserting copyrights in particular medical tests, and PAR itself offers more than
30 varieties of copyrighted testing from a chronic pain test to a trauma
symptom checklist. As a result, primary care physicians, neurologists and
psychiatrists are struggling to understand the notion of copyright in their daily
treatment of patients, fretting about the possibility that they may have been
infringing copyrights for some time, and puzzling over how they could
Mar. 20, 2012). See also About PAR, http://www4.parinc.com/About.aspx (last visited Mar.
20, 2012).
11. Ruth Martin & Desmond O’Neil, Taxing Your Memory, 373 THE LANCET 1997,
2009-10 (2009).
12. Fong et al., Development and Validation of a Brief Cognitive Assessment Tool:
The Sweet 16, ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED., 432, 436 (2011) (internal citation omitted).
13. Elizabeth Cooney, Quick Quiz Screens for Cognitive Impairment, WHITE COAT
NOTES - BOSTON.COM (Nov. 8, 2010, 4:14PM), http://www.boston.com/news/health/blog/
2010/11/sweet_16_tests.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
14. See Update About the Sweet 16 Instrument, HOSPITAL FOR ELDER LIFE PROGRAM
(HELP), http://www.hospitalelderlifeprogram.org/private/sweet16-disclaimer.php?pageid=
01.09.00 (last updated Jan. 13, 2012).
15. Jim Amos, Persisting Popularity of the Sweet 16 Saga, THE PRACTICAL
PSYCHOSOMATICIST: JAMES AMOS, M.D (May 31, 2011), http://jajsamos.wordpress.com/
2011/05/31/persisting-popularity-of-the-sweet-16-saga/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
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suddenly find themselves in the company of MP3 downloaders and movie
bootleggers.
II.

RELEVANT CONCEPTS IN COPYRIGHT

In general, society provides protection for intellectual property in the
interests of encouraging innovation and creativity. Although one could find
animating logic for an intellectual property regime from a variety of theoretical
perspectives, the US system has always been unabashedly utilitarian. That is,
we grant rights to creators and innovators in the hopes that it will encourage
creation and innovation, which we believe will redound to the benefit of
society as a whole. Thus, it is not that we reward inventors because we believe
they are inherently deserving of reward, we reward inventors because we
believe this will benefit society as a whole. Although we have made occasional
forays into moral rights, generally in the context of satisfying our treaty
obligations, the US intellectual property system has remained steadfastly
focused on creating the optimal incentives that will promote innovation and
creativity.16
Copyright applies to any original work of authorship fixed in a tangible
medium of expression.17 Under modern copyright law, although not the law in
force at the creation of the Mini-Mental State Exam, an author is not required
to take any affirmative steps for copyright to accrue. Prior American copyright
law required that an author go through certain formalities to obtain copyrights,
such as inserting proper notations on a work of authorship and submitting a
copy of the work to the Library of Congress. Under modern law, however,
copyright attaches from the moment of fixation in a tangible medium. Thus,
everything written down—from the noblest novel to the humblest email—may
have copyrights attached, assuming that the writing is an original work and that
it displays a modicum of creativity.18

16. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (noting that, “The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful
Arts.’”); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (SDNY 1992),
aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (CA2 1994) (noting that “the incentive to profit from the exploitation of
copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of
knowledge . . . . The profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.”). The
Supreme Court seems to have subtly retreated from that position in 2003 in Eldred v.
Ashcroft. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (arguing against Justice
Breyer’s dissenting opinion by stating that, “Justice Breyer’s assertion that ‘copyright
statutes must serve public, not private, ends’ similarly misses the mark. The two ends are not
mutually exclusive; copyright law serves public ends by providing individuals with an
incentive to pursue private ones.”) (citations omitted).
17. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a). See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“copyright assures authors the right to their original expression”).
18. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. See, e.g., New York Mercantile Exch., Inc. v.
IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that commodity
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Copyright also protects a compilation work, which is defined as “a work
formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that
are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a
whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”19 A compilation copyright
protects the order and manner of the presentation of the compilation’s
elements, but it does not necessarily extend to the elements themselves.20 Some
works, such as those that are factually based or are compilations of facts,
receive a lower level of copyright protection than purely fictional works. This
is known as “thin” copyright protection.
Although a work may be copyrighted, this does not mean that everything
within the work is protected from copying. Copyright does not protect the idea
of a work, but only the specific expression that is used.21 As the Supreme Court
recently noted, this “idea/expression dichotomy strikes a definitional balance
between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author’s expression.” Due to
this distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes
instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of publication.22
In the classic example discussed by countless law students across time, if
Shakespeare were to write Romeo and Juliet today, he would be able to protect
aspects such as the plot lines and the dialogue, but he would not be able to
protect the idea of a story about two star-crossed lovers from feuding families
who die tragically.23 In other words, copyright protects the way in which an

futures exchange did not have copyright in settlement prices it produced); Southco, Inc. v.
Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that parts numbers were not
copyrightable, as they are both not original and analogous to short phrases or titles);
Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
publisher’s factual enhancements to judicial opinions were not sufficiently creative or
original to warrant copyright). For this article, I will focus on copyright as it applied to
written works, although copyright applies to a wide range of creative works, including
sculptures, photographs, maps, and computer software.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
20. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
21. Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“The general rule of law is that the noblest of human productions—knowledge,
truths ascertained, conceptions and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others,
free as the air to common use.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at 54, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 (“Copyright does not preclude others from using ideas or
information revealed by the author’s work.”)
22. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (citing Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
23. See 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.03[A][1][b] (updated 2011) (hereinafter Nimmer on Copyright) (explaining the
idea/expression dichotomy by offering West Side Story as an example of a work that
theoretically infringes on Romeo and Juliet. “Certainly, the dialogue and setting, and even
much of the characterization, story line and action, are far removed from the Shakespeare
play. Yet, applying the pattern test, it will be seen that not merely the basic idea, but the
essential sequence of events, as well as the interplay of the characters, are straight out of

630

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:485

author chooses to express an idea or a set of facts, but not the idea or facts
themselves. Thus, writing a textbook that teaches and explains chemistry does
not give the author rights in the formulas explained, although it may give the
author rights in the particular way in which the formulas are explained.24
In a similar vein, copyright protection does not extend to things such as
systems, procedures, and methods of operation. Not only are these analogous to
underlying ideas and formulas, they are also the purview of patent law.25
Granting copyrights to these would create a backdoor method for allowing
those unable to meet the more rigorous requirements of patent law to block
access to these nonetheless. An author’s description of the procedure may be
copyrighted, but not the procedure itself.26
In unusual circumstances, there may be only one or a limited number of
ways to express an idea. In that case, even the expression is not copyrightable
on the grounds that granting copyright to the expression would grant an
impermissible right over an idea itself.27 Thus, when an idea and its expression
are inseparable, copyright law considers that the two have “merged” into a
single expression, which is not copyrightable. 28
Similarly, if certain elements are all but indispensable to works in a
particular genre—e.g. an amorous embrace in a romantic comedy, the inclusion
of two teams and a ball in a football video game, references to a deity in sacred
music, etc.—such elements are not copyrightable. These are referred to as
scenes a faire, which is described as “incidents, characters or settings which are
as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard in the treatment of a
given topic.”29 In those circumstances, courts have reasoned that these
elements are so close to the non-protectable idea that the expression provides
nothing new or additional beyond the idea itself.30

‘Romeo and Juliet.’”)
24. William F. Patry, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, § 4:42 (updated Feb. 2012).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (noting that copyright does not extend to “any idea, procedure,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of form in which it
is described, explained, illustrated or embodied”). See, e.g., Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky,
Skelly, Eng’rs LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 468 (2d Cir. 2002); Attia v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 201 F.3d
50, 54 (2d Cir. 1999); Alexander v. Irving Trust Co., 228 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1955); Reyher v.
Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976).
26. SecureInfo Corp. v. Telos Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 593, 611 (E.D. Va. 2005).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
28. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971) (“When the ‘idea’ and its ‘expression’ are thus inseparable, copying the ‘expression’
will not be barred, since protecting the ‘expression’ in such circumstances would confer a
monopoly of the ‘idea’ upon the copyright owner.”).
29. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th
Cir. 1987) (citing Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See e.g., Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (an
expression will be found to be merged into the idea when “there are no or few other ways of
expressing a particular idea.”). See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Products, Inc. v.
McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1977).
30. See Frybarger v. IBM Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Atari, 672
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Copyright, at its core, protects the right to make copies of something. This
can include photocopying a book, performing a play, or singing a song.
Copyright also provides the exclusive right to create derivative works, which
can include things such as a movie based on a play, a biography based on
journal entries, a compilation or abridgement, and other forms of new versions
based on an original.31
III.

WHAT COULD BE THE INFRINGEMENT?

What exactly could creators of cognitive and related medical testing claim
as an infringement of their rights? Understanding the question requires parsing
through the different materials related to each test. The most obvious avenue
would be to claim that institutions are making unauthorized copies of
instructions or general information related to the test. These would include
descriptions of what the test is for, the circumstances that are appropriate for
using the test, and any other descriptive information. Anyone copying the
author’s explanation of these things verbatim, or in a way that is sufficiently
similar, could be liable for copyright infringement.32 This would be a gardenvariety copyright infringement test, although interesting issues might arise over
the question of whether there are only one or a limited number of ways to give
certain instructions or information about the test. In an unusual case, for
example, a circuit court found that copying contest instructions almost wordfor-word did not constitute copyright infringement.33 The contest itself was not
copyrightable, presumably as a system or method of doing business. On the
almost verbatim copying of the instructions, the court found that while more
than one form of expression was possible, “at best only a limited number” of
forms of expression could exist, with the result that copyright protection could
not be extended to that expression.34
The more interesting question relates to copying the test itself. On one
level, test authors could claim that regardless of whether any expressive
F.2d at 616). See also Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 742.
31. See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Registration for Derivative Works,
Copyright Circular 14 (2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf.
32. See, e.g., Atari, 672 F.2d at 614 (“[T]he test is whether the accused work is so
similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the
defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protectable expression by taking material
of substance and value.”); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164; Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468
(2d Cir. 1946) (copying can be found if the similarities between two works are “so striking
as to preclude the possibility that the plaintiff and defendant independently arrived at the
same result.”). See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501.
33. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967)
(“When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that ‘the topic necessarily
requires,’ if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit
copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms,
could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance.”) (citing Sampson & Murdock
Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1905)).
34. Id.
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description or instructions about the test were included, a copy of the words of
the test itself would constitute copyright infringement. Thus, if an institution
printed reminder cards or posted the test on its internal website, those actions
would constitute infringement. One might also claim that each written
application of the test constitutes a separate copy. For researchers who
administer the test through a written, online survey, for example, PAR does
indeed charge a license fee for each person who takes the test.35
It is difficult to imagine how the authors could try to claim that
administering the test verbally could constitute making a copy of the test. In
order to constitute infringement, a copy must be fixed in a tangible form, and
oral admission of the test would lack this element of fixation.36 Although
verbal performances of certain works may require a license, if the performance
is public,37 administering a test to an individual patient would not constitute a
public performance. Most important, the statute specifies that the performance
right is limited to literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic, pantomime,
motion picture, and other audiovisual works.38 Administering a test to a patient
would not fall within any of these categories.
On its website, PAR is rather delicate in its language concerning just
exactly what must be licensed.39 The Permissions and Licensing page explains
that the procedures are for granting permission to “use any of our publications”
and that the company will consider requests “for permission to reproduce,
modify, or translate any copyrighted publication.”40 Thus, the language
carefully grounds itself in references to the written publications and
reproduction of those, and could suggest that PAR is asking for no more than
licensing for traditional copies of written materials.
Other parts of the page and the permission request form hint that PAR is
asserting rights to each admission of the test, whether verbal or written. The
page states that written permission is required prior to “using any part of a test”
and notes that the per copy royalty fee does not include the cost of purchasing
the test manual, which is required for permission to use all or part of the test.41
In addition, the permission request form, which must be submitted before PAR
will agree to quote a royalty fee, includes questions such as “how many people
will you be testing” and “how many times will each person be tested.”42 The

35. See email from Vicki McFadden, PAR Permission Specialist (May 7, 2013) (on
file with author).
36. See 17 U.S.C.A. §101 (definitional section of the statute defining copies as
material objects in which a work is fixed).
37. See 17 U.S.C.A. §106(4).
38. See id.
39. See PAR, Permissions and Licensing, http://www4.parinc.com/Products/
PermissionsAndLicensing.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. (noting that the fee will be determined after PAR reviews the request
form).
See
also
PAR,
Permission
Request
Form
Online
Submission,
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implication is that, among other things, PAR is requiring a license and charging
for each verbal admission of the test, and our conversations with physicians
and hospital administrators indicate that the medical community understands
PAR’s licensing demands in that manner. Regardless of how far the PAR
organization is claiming rights, it is important to think through each potential
claim that could be made within the context of cognitive or similar medical
testing.
The challenging thread running through all of this is that medical tests of
this kind stand at the boundary between patent and copyright, raising the mindbending question of how to conceptualize a process, which is the purview of
patent, when that process consists of nothing more than words, which is
normally the purview of copyright. The section below traces the tangled
modern case law in this area back to the 1879 case of Baker v. Selden43 to
make sense of the question.
IV.

THE TROUBLE WITH BAKER

There are remarkably few lines of case law in copyright that are analogous
to cognitive testing, and those that exist reach conflicting conclusions on both
the outcomes in particular circumstances and the proper analytic framework.
All of them, however, trace their heritage back to the 1879 Supreme Court case
of Baker v. Selden.44 The Baker case and its proper interpretation have been the
subject of considerable controversy, particularly as they relate to the proper
approach for copyright protection of computer programs.45
Baker concerned copyright for a book explaining a new book-keeping
system. The innovation of the bookkeeping system lay in its ability to display a
particular time period—a day, a week, or a month—on a single page or two
pages facing each other. The book contained an introductory essay describing
the system followed by blank forms with the columns and heading arranged to
illustrate the system. The accused copier used a similar system with the
columns and headings arranged differently.
The Court focused on the contrast between a book itself and the system a
https://www4.parinc.com/webuploads/permission_request/Permission_Req_Form_
distributed.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
43. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Samuelson, infra note 46, at 1948-53 (arguing that Baker has suffered
from misinterpretation); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1149, 1171-76 (1998) (arguing that uncertainty of copyright for computer programs
raises fundamental questions about copyright subject matter); J.H. Reichman, Computer
Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for
Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 690-95 (1989) (arguing that
intellectual property law is underprotective of new technologies, particularly software). See
also Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 23, at § 2.18[C]-[D] and William F. Patry,
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 182, 212, 225 (6th ed. 1994) (discussion on software
copyright).
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book is intended to teach or illustrate.46 The book, and the words chosen by
the author to describe the system it is teaching, can be protected against
copying. The system itself, however, is free to all, unless the author wishes to
apply for a patent on the system, which would require a much more extensive
demonstration of novelty than is necessary under copyright law. As the Court
noted,
A treatise on the composition and use of medicines, be they old or new; on the
construction and use of ploughs, or watches, or churns; or on the mixture and
application of colors for painting or dyeing; or on the mode of drawing lines
to produce the effect of perspective, —would be the subject of copyright; but
no one would contend that the copyright of the treatise would give the
exclusive right to the art or manufacture described therein . . . . To give to the
author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no
examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise
and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of
copyright.47

The history of the Baker case demonstrates the danger of allowing
copyright protection under these circumstances. Prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision, the widow of the treatise-writer had tried to impose license fees
throughout Ohio on those who were using the accounting system.48 In this
manner, the Baker case is reminiscent of the attempts to charge for each use of
the Mini-Mental State Examination.49
The Court’s statement is remarkably straightforward, but the application of
the principle is more complex than it appears—and would become even more
so across time. For example, one might conceivably argue that the copyright
holder in Baker was not trying to prevent individual bookkeepers from using
the new system, but simply wanted to prevent other publishers from copying
his forms and selling them to people using the system. Historical evidence in
the case, carefully traced in a recent article by Pamela Samuelson, suggests the
contrary.50 The copyright holder in the case actually did attempt to apply
copyright to individual uses of the bookkeeping system, not just copies made
by competing publishers.
The Baker case, nevertheless, demonstrated the problem in trying to draw a
distinction of even this limited kind. If the forms are an essential part of
practicing the system, preventing copying of the forms prevents anyone from
using the system itself. Thus, protecting the forms would give copyright

46. For a detailed history of the Baker v. Selden case as well as an explication of how
the case has been misinterpreted, see Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes
Systems and Processes from the Scope of its Protection, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 1921 (2007).
47. Baker, 101 U.S. at 102.
48. For a fascinating and detailed description of the history of Baker v. Selden, see
Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between
Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES, (Jane C. Ginsburg &
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, eds.) (Foundation Press 2005).
49. See text accompanying notes 35-42, supra.
50. See Samuelson, supra note 46, at 1931.
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holders a backdoor method of obtaining patent-like control over the process
without satisfying any of the requirements for obtaining a patent.51
The Baker Court identified the heart of the problem, noting that “where
the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and diagrams
used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and
diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given
therewith to the public.”52
The Court went on to hold that blank account-books are not the subject of
copyright and that the author’s copyright in the book explaining the accounting
system did not give him the exclusive right to make and use the forms included
in the book.53
The most direct codification of Baker v. Selden can be found in the
regulatory prohibition on copyright protection for blank forms. Copyright
Office regulations now provides that “[b]lank forms, such as time cards, graph
paper, account books, diaries, blank checks, address books, report forms, order
forms and the like, which are designed for recording information and do not in
themselves convey information,” are not subject to copyright.54
The Copyright Act also contains a limitation on copyright subject matter
that echoes the discussion in Baker. Specifically, § 102(b) states that, “In no
case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, plan, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is . . . embodied in such
work.”55 The language emerged as part of the debate concerning the extent to
which computer programs should be given copyright protection.56
Application of Baker and the corresponding language in the legislation and
regulations has stirred considerable debate among judges and scholars. What is
particularly striking in the case law is the extent to which judges have
expressed discomfort or uncertainty about the decision they felt obligated to
reach and the underlying logic—regardless of whether the decision involved
upholding copyright protection or denying copyright protection to a work that
involved a blank form. Consider the case of Advanz Behavioral Management
51. See id. at 1932 (citing Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer
Programs, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 119, 1130 (1986), for the proposition that “the presence of
patent law’s rigorous standards cautions courts . . . not to allow copyright, with its notably
lax standards, to protect functional elements of copyrighted works.”).
52. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
53. Id. at 106.
54. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c). See Bibbero Systems, Inc. v. Colwell Systems, Inc., 893 F.2d
1104, 1106 (9th Cir.1990) (describing 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 as a “codification” of Baker). But
see Mfrs. Techs., Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 994 (D. Conn. 1989); Digital Com.
Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (printed forms
and electronic screens that convey de minimis information or contain copyrightable subject
matter are copyrightable).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (promulgated as part of the 1976 Copyright Act).
56. See Samuelson, supra note 46, at 1944-52 (tracing the development of the 1976
Copyright Act from the introduction of a copyright revision bill in 1964).
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Resources, Inc. v. Miraflor.57 The plaintiff in Advanz operated a home health
care business and claimed copyright in a series of five forms used for recording
patient information. Those forms were titled Medical Social Service
Evaluation, [Medical Social Service] Communication Note, Medical Social
Service Discharge Summary, Medical Social Service Follow-up, and Daily
Visit Route Sheet. Applying Ninth Circuit precedent, the judge in the Central
District of California denied copyright protection, while bemoaning his
obligation to do so. With thinly disguised disapproval, the judge wrote a
lengthy discussion of case law in the Ninth Circuit, noting conflicting
approaches in other jurisdictions.58 He concluded with the comment that the
Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence in this area exemplifies an “unusual and
unfortunate feature of contemporary copyright law,” and one that ignores the
policy issues at stake.59
On the flip side, the Second Circuit, which had declined the opportunity to
follow the Ninth Circuit precedent, allowed a copyright claim on a form for
compiling statistics in baseball to survive summary judgment in the Kregos
case. In allowing the copyright claim to move forward, however, the court
engaged in its own handwringing.
In reaching this conclusion, we confess to some unease because of the risk
that protection of selections of data, or, as in this case, categories of data, have
the potential for according protection to ideas. Our concern may be illustrated
by an example of a doctor who publishes a list of symptoms that he believes
provides a helpful diagnosis of a disease.60

Of course, the Kregos hypothetical is reminiscent of attempting to copyright
medical testing of cognitive function, a similarity that will be explored below.
Although the Kregos court upheld copyright protection, the copyright
holder had less to cheer about than one might imagine. The court found that the
level of protection provided was quite limited, following the notion described
above that copyright protection is thin for works that are merely compilations
of facts.61 As a result, the court found that the arrangement of the statistics
lacked even the minimal amount of creativity required for copyright
protection.62 In addition, although the decision of which statistics to include did
contain the requisite creativity for copyright protection, the court cast doubt on
57. Advanz Behavioral Mgmt. Res., Inc. v. Miraflor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (C.D. Cal.

1998).
58. See id. at 1186-1192 (noting that the Ninth Circuit had cited with disapproval N.
Printing Co. v. Augustana Hosp., 155 U.S.P.Q. 133 (N.D. Ill. 1967), and that the Second
Circuit had distinguished the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Kregos v. Associated Press, 937
F.2d 700, 708 (2d Cir.1991) (stating that “many courts have recognized that there can be
protectable elements of forms that include considerable blank spaces.”), on remand, 795 F.
Supp. 1325 (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff’d after remand, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1112 (1994)).
59. See Advanz, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1191.
60. See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707.
61. See text accompanying notes 19-21.
62. See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 709.
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whether the accused infringer’s rearrangement of the data could constitute
infringement. In particular, the court suggested that an overlapping, although
somewhat different selection of statistics, would not infringe.63
Finding a coherent and consistent logic does seem to have eluded the
courts on this issue across time. The cases have reached a variety of results and
applied different lines of logic for claims related to blank forms. Some have
looked favorably on claims of copyright. For example, one case upheld
copyright on a work titled, “Cash Dividend Check Pay to the Order of.”64
Although the facts as described by the court are not a model of clarity, the work
appears to have been a book of checks to use in connection with a savings
stamp plan, with instructions on the checks concerning how to affix the stamps
as payment. At the time, the relevant regulatory language, which differs only
slightly from the modern language, read as follows:
The following are examples of works not subject to copyright and applications
for registration of such works cannot be entertained: (c) Words designed for
recording information which do not in themselves convey information, such as
time cards, graph paper, account books, diaries, bank checks, score cards,
address books, report forms, order forms and the like.65

Nevertheless, the court upheld the copyright claim. The court held that in
addition to including the unfilled-out form of a check, the writing conveys to
the public information relating to its stamp plan. Thus, the court reasoned, the
work constituted an integration of the two such that there was sufficient
originality, and that this level of originality permitted copyright to attach.66
Another court in Norton v. Augustana Hospital denied a motion to dismiss
a claim for copyright protection of a series of forms for recording medical
laboratory tests.67 The court reasoned that although the forms were used to
record information, the format and arrangement could also serve to convey
information about the types of tests to be conducted and the information which
is deemed important.68
Other cases have been less hospitable to those who would claim copyright
in forms for recording information. For example, one court rejected copyright
protection for “superbill” forms that doctors could use to obtain reimbursement
from insurance companies.69 The forms contained simple instructions to the
patient for filing insurance claims; boxes for patient information; simple
clauses assigning insurance benefits to the doctor and authorizing release of
patient information; and two lengthy checklists for the doctor to indicate the

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id. at 709-710.
See Check Corp. v. Davis, 247 F.2d 458, 459 (9th Cir. 1957).
See id. at 460.
Id.
Norton Printing Co. v. Augustana Hosp., 155 U.S.P.Q. 133, 1967 WL 7487
(N.D.Ill.1967).
68. See id. at 135.
69. Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1990).
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diagnosis and any services performed, as well as the applicable fee.70
In declining to adopt the Norton court’s rule, the court argued the
following:
Norton’s holding that a medical laboratory test form “conveyed information”
because it contained some of the possible categories of information but not
others, thus indicating which information was important, is potentially
limitless. All forms seek only certain information, and, by their selection,
convey that the information sought is important. This cannot be what the
Copyright Office intended by the statement “convey information” in 37 C.F.R.
202.1(c).71

The court was referring to the language of the copyright regulations—language
that lists as among the types of works not subject to copyright, “Blank forms,
such as time cards, graph paper, account books, diaries, bank checks,
scorecards, address books, report forms, order forms and the like, which are
designed for recording information and do not in themselves convey
information.”72
Baker and its legislative progeny have been the subject of significant
scholarly and judicial criticism, with scholars themselves adopting differing
approaches and viewpoints.73 These debates, along with detailed discussions
of the inconsistent case decisions, have been admirably chronicled in prior
scholarly work, as well as in the careful protest penned by the magistrate judge
in the Advanz case.74 Key arguments include the following: detractors contend,
among other things, that the prohibition on copyright protection for blank
forms is based on an unwarranted extension of dicta from Baker v. Selden, that
it is logically inconsistent and at odds with the rest of copyright law, and that it
is incompatible with guidelines set forth by the Copyright Office following the
1976 revision.75 Professor Nimmer summarized these criticisms by way of
examples:
The Regulations seem to be unjustified in denying copyrightability to any
work merely because it is designed for recording information. Thus, books
intended to record the events of baby’s first year, or a record of a European
trip, or any one of a number of other subjects, may evince considerable
originality in suggestions of specific items of information that are to be
recorded, and in the arrangement of such items.76

70.
71.
72.
73.

See id. at 1105.
Id. at 1107.
37 C.F.R. 202.1(c).
See e.g., Samuelson, supra note 46; Weinreb, supra note 45; Reichman, supra

note 45.
74. See, e.g., Nimmer on Copyright § 2.18[A]–[D]; Pamela Samuelson, Why
Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of its Protection, 85 TEXAS
L. REV. 1921 (2007); Advanz Behavioral Mgmt. Res. v. Miraflor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (C.D.
Cal. 1998); see also other authors cited note 73, supra.
75. See Nimmer on Copyright § 2.18[A]–[D]; William F. Patry, COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE 328 (6th ed. 1994)
76. Nimmer on Copyright § 2.18[C][2] at 204.2. Numerous courts have cited to this
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In contrast, proponents of the rule have offered justification based on at least
four distinct rationales:77 (1) blank forms contain no expression;78 (2) some
blank forms may contain expression, but that expression is unoriginal;79 (3)
some blank forms contain expression, but that expression is indistinguishable
from the idea it expresses;80 and (4) blank forms, no matter their design, do not
convey information, but are merely repositories for information.81 Common to
these rationales is the notion that documents which are “designed for recording
information and do not in themselves convey information”82 lack even a
modicum of creativity, and thus fail the originality requirement of § 101 of the
Copyright Act.83 The Copyright Office has affirmed this interpretation of 37
C.F.R. § 202.1(c):
An item that serves merely as a means for recording information and does not
itself convey information or contain original pictorial expression does not
constitute copyrightable subject matter . . . . The Copyright Office . . . applies
a standard consistent with that applied to all works submitted for registration:
does the work contain an appreciable quantum of original, creative
expression?84

V.

OUTSIDE THE UMBRELLA OF COPYRIGHT

In analyzing the issue of whether copyright should apply to medical testing
such as the MMSE, the most helpful approach flows from Professor
Samuelson’s scholarly work in the context of copyright protection, and
limitations on that protection, for computer programs.
Samuelson recently chronicled a long detour in which courts and
commentators characterized Baker as nothing more than precedent for the
idea/expression distinction and the notion that only certain elements of a
copyrighted work will be protected. In contrast, Samuelson traced the judicial
and legislative history indicating that Baker and subsequent legislation
intended to mark off certain areas as entirely outside the protection of
copyright. Thus, things such as processes, systems and methods should be

passage. See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 709 (2d Cir. 1991) (allowing a
copyright claim on a form for compiling statistics in baseball to survive summary judgment
but finding that the protection would be thin); Miraflor, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 (discussed
below); Frederick Chusid & Co. v. Marshall Leeman & Co., 279 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (upholding copyright in “personal data forms”).
77. See Miraflor, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1184.
78. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 107.
79. See, e.g., John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 971–972
(11th Cir. 1983); 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c).
80. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 107.
81. See, e.g., Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir.
1990).
82. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c).
83. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
84. 45 Fed. Reg. 63299–63300 (Sept. 24, 1980).
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entirely beyond copyright protection, regardless of the form in which they are
embodied.
The difference is more than academic. Samuelson carefully demonstrated
how courts following the “Baker describes the difference between ideas and
expression” approach in computer software cases granted protection too
broadly, particularly in cases relating to granting protection for the structure,
sequence, and organization of the program as well as to the look and feel of the
software.85 In contrast, she argues that a firmer grasp of the notion that the
Supreme Court and Congress intended to place processes and systems entirely
outside the realm of copyright protection will lead to a better interpretation of
the limitations on the categories of things granted protection within the field of
computer software.
Samuelson also notes that some courts have tried to skirt the problem by
using the scenes a faire doctrine or noting a lack of originality to avoid
granting copyright protection to systems or functions.86 In other words, one
could argue that instructions embodying a system cannot be copyrighted
because such a system can only be described in a certain way or because
describing the system in that way lacked originality to begin with. She points
out that the problem with relying on this type of approach is that in many cases,
the instructions chosen are not the only way to accomplish something, and they
may indeed contain sufficient originality to meet the low threshold required for
copyright protection.87
To some extent, the problem in this area lies with a confusion between the
notion of a system in general and the notion of a system in particular. This
distinction may be more apparent in the context of medical testing than
computer programs. If the question is a system in general for testing cognition,
there will always be many ways to go about it. If the question, however, is one
particular system for testing cognition, there is only one way to express that
system because the expression of the system—in this case, the words used to
carry out the test—is the system. Protecting those words would grant protection
to the system itself.
From this perspective, Samuelson’s admonition to remain true to Baker
and to remember that systems should be excluded from copyright protection
makes sense. That approach is a cleaner way to ensure that in applying
copyright protection, we will not inadvertently cast the net of protection too
widely.
Applying the logic of the Samuelson approach, the words of medical tests
should be entirely beyond the subject of copyright. They are a system, a
method of going about something: a process for determining the level of brain

85. See id. at 1974 (noting that courts misled by the narrower interpretation of Baker
have erroneously granted copyright protection to methods of organizing information, parts
numbering systems, and coding systems).
86. See id. at 1974-77.
87. Id. at 1976-77.
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functioning. If they represent sufficient novelty and meet the other
requirements of patentability, the person who designed the test can seek a
patent on a method of determining cognitive functioning. From the perspective
of copyright, however, the test itself lies outside the protection of copyright,
regardless of what form the test is embodied in.88 Written words, spoken
words, and—when inventors take us to this point—telepathically transmitted
words, none of these would fall within the subject of copyright protection. As
always, however, words used to explain, teach, provide the background and
history of, or otherwise amplify the test may be copyrightable, as long as one is
not attempting to copyright the words of the system itself.
VI.

INSIDE THE UMBRELLA OF COPYRIGHT

For those unpersuaded by the notion that blank forms should fall outside
the umbrella of copyright, an analysis of the requirements for triggering
protection when a work falls within the copyright system should still lead to a
denial of protection for cognitive medical testing. Cognitive medical testing
falls on the unprotected side of the lines that have been drawn in analogous
cases that treat blank forms as falling within the umbrella of copyright and
copyrightable under some circumstances.
A. Selection & Compilation
For example, courts in some circumstances have given copyright
protection to forms when the questions to which one fills in the answer
represent a selection among possible existing facts. The Second Circuit in
Kregos granted copyright protection to a pitching form distributed to
newspapers that contained nine categories of information about opposing
pitchers scheduled to start that day’s baseball game.89 The same circuit granted
copyright protection to a selection of 500 out of 18,000 baseball cards
considered to be “premium”90 but denied copyright protection to a compilation
of five items of information about various municipal bond calls—items of
information that had appeared in “tombstone ads.”91 In reconciling the three
cases, the Second Circuit explained that with compilations of facts, the
originality component, that is, the creative part, involved deciding which facts

88. See Thomas G. Field, Jr., Should Copyright Protect Evaluative Tools? IP
FRONTLINE (Jan. 11, 2012) (op/ed arguing that “[a]s seen from the perspective of Baker, the
MMSE is the art; it describes nothing; its object is use, not explanation”) available at
https://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.aspx?id=26212&deptid=4
89. See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991), on remand, 795
F.Supp. 1325 (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff’d after remand, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1112 (1994).
90. See Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
91. See Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
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are important. When the universe of possible facts is sufficiently great, the
creator may be able to demonstrate the originality necessary for copyright
protection, particularly when the selection is different from prior groupings.92
The cases regarding compilation and selection of facts generally involve
choosing among a universe of facts that are already known and easily
ascertainable. This is quite different from cognitive medical testing. The
difference appears to be what was bothering the Kregos court when it
expressed unease about its decision. As described above, in finding copyright
protection for the newspaper pitching form, the Kregos court expressed
concern that, “protection of selections of data, or, as in this case, categories of
data, have the potential for according protection to ideas. Our concern may be
illustrated by an example of a doctor who publishes a list of symptoms that he
believes provides a helpful diagnosis of a disease.”93 This hypothetical, of
course, comes eerily close to the notion of trying to copyright medical testing.
The creative and original element in cognitive medical testing is really
about finding a process for diagnosis, that is, a process for figuring out whether
a patient has a particular disease or mental state. It is not about choosing from
facts that are easily accessed, it is about finding a way to get to facts that are
not. One can think of the activity in the following manner: The fact that exists
is “whether the mind is working properly” or “how the mind is working in
comparison to other minds.” The creator’s contribution is figuring out a process
to get to that fact.
Thus, although one is certainly choosing among a large universe of
questions, that choice is in pursuit of the best process for determining facts
about that person’s health. In the copyright terminology that the Kregos court
was using, that fact is no more than an idea, and thus would not deserve
copyright protection. In the language of whether something belongs in patent or
copyright, the creative element is a process. Protection of a process does not
belong in copyright but is the purview of patents. Thus, if any protection were
available, it would be found in patent law, where we asks tougher questions,
including how much of an advance is your process over prior processes that
existed and were you, in fact, the first to invent it.
Finally, even in finding copyright protection, the Kregos court granted a
remarkably limited level of protection. The court determined that an
overlapping set of items would not infringe the copyright, if the items differed
in anything more than “a trivial degree.”94 Thus, even if a court were to find
copyright protection, which we believe would be improper here, variations of

92. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 704-705; see also Wabash Publ’g. Co. v. Flanagan, No. 89-C1923, 1989 WL 32939 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 1989); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. New Eng.
Newspaper Publ’g Co., 46 F.Supp. 198, 201-02 (D. Mass. 1942); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Sports Eye, Inc., 415 F.Supp. 682, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Matthew Bender & Co. v. Kluwer
Law Book Publishers, Inc., 672 F.Supp. 107, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
93. See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707.
94. See id. at 710.
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the test should not constitute infringement unless the differences are truly
trivial.
B. Secured Testing & Licensing
Of particular interest to those who would like to claim copyright in medical
testing would be a line of cases upholding copyright protection for secure cases
involving licensing and admissions exams. These have included exams for
medical licensing, law licensing and college admissions, as well as the foreign
service exam.95 For example, in Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman96 and Educ.
Testing Servs. v. Simon,97 the company that makes the SAT and other
standardized tests sued test preparation companies for distributing copies of
prior tests and using prep questions adapted from prior tests.98 Both opinions
found that the test questions themselves fell within the domain of copyright,
and the Simon court also held that verbatim copying of questions contained in a
test was not necessary for a finding of copyright infringement.99
Secured testing circumstances are a special case, however, and the logic
frequently revolves around the existence of and necessity for security.
Discussion frequently focuses on the level of security involved and on the
importance of preserving the integrity of the exam. Secured testing is of such
importance that it receives special mention in the legislative history of the
Copyright Act. In the 1991 amendments to the Copyright Act relating to Fair
Use, the Senate Report accompanying the Act explained that the amendments
were “not intended to reduce the protection of secure tests, the utility of which
is especially vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure.”100 Statements in the
debate on the amendments underscored the same notion, with one Senator
specifically mentioning the ACT, SAT, LSAT and MCAT.101

95. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Mikaelian, 571 F.Supp. 144, 150 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(copyright upheld for medical school admission test), aff’d, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984); Nat’l
Conference of Bar Exam’rs v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 495 F.Supp. 34, 36 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (copyright upheld for bar examination), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 692 F.2d 478 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983); Katzman, 793 F.2d at 539; ETS v. Miller, 1991
WL 212181 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1991) (upholding copyright and finding that “[a] copyright in
a compilation of questions, such as the Foreign Service Exam, includes copyright protection
for the questions themselves.”).
96. Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1986).
97. Educ. Testing Servs. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
98. See Katzman, 793 F.2d at 536.
99. See Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1088.
100. See S.Rep. No. 141, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1991).
101. See 137 Cong. Rec. S13923 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1991) (statement of Senator
Grassley noting that Congress was not intending to “weaken the very strong protection that
the courts have given to an important type of copyrighted work—secure tests such as the
ACT, SAT, LSAT, and MCAT”); see also testimony of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights
(“Secure tests are particularly vulnerable to having their utility obliterated by unauthorized
disclosure. The courts have, accordingly, been particularly solicitous in protecting these
works. Indeed, so far as we are aware, the courts have never upheld a fair use claim
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One could argue that protecting the sanctity of professional licensing and
admissions exams is best left to regimes other than copyright. For example,
Section 123 of the California Business and Professions Code prohibits “any
conduct which subverts or attempts to subvert an licensing examination.”
Protection of such tests through copyright has a long history, however, and
remains the current law.
The licensing and admissions cases frequently involve circumstances in
which extensive precautions are taken to ensure that the tests are carefully
guarded. The PAR site suggests that the usefulness and validity of the tests
would be compromised if the tests became available to the public.102 PAR
notes that the company secures its materials during development—by requiring
employees, external consultants, and pilot testing administrators to sign a
confidentiality agreement—and after development—by making sure that the
materials are sold only to qualified individuals obligated by professional ethical
standards to protect the integrity by maintaining confidentiality.103
The website gives this explanation in a section asserting that the tests are
protected by copyright and trade secret, and that purchasers may not reveal the
test questions or any other materials. Purchasers are also forbidden from
releasing a patient’s data or the results of a patient’s test to individuals who are
not qualified to review and interpret them, including the patient.104 In other
words, purchasers are not even permitted to tell the patient what the results
were. The PAR website notes further that the Department of Health & Human
Services has provided guidance in a letter stating that it is not a violation of
HIPAA to refrain from providing an individual’s health information if doing so
would disclose trade secrets.105
The security protection that PAR describes sounds much more like gardenvariety trade secret protection, rather than the heightened security measures
taken with licensing exams. To give one minor example, licensing exams
generally change their question for each test whereas the MMSE has remained
the same for an extended period. The issues at stake in maintaining the integrity
of the MMSE also are not commensurate with the issues at stake in maintaining
advanced by any private entity with regard to copying of secure tests or test questions.”)
102. PAR Frequently Asked Questions, http://www4.parinc.com/Faqs.aspx (last visited
May 4, 2013).
103. See PAR Position Regarding the Release and/or Photocopying of Test Materials,
http://www4.parinc.com/WebUploads/StaticPages/PhotocopyingTestMaterials.pdf
(last
visited May 4, 2013).
104. See PAR Frequently Asked Questions, http://www4.parinc.com/Faqs.aspx (last
visited May 4, 2013).
105. See HIPPA Statement, http://www4.parinc.com/webuploads/staticpages/
HIPAA_Statement.pdf (last visited May 4, 2013) (citing the following as language from a
US Department of Health and Human Services letter:
“Any requirement for disclosure of protected health information pursuant to the Privacy Rule
is subject to section 1172(e) of HIPAA ‘protection of trade secrets.’ As such, we confirm that
it would not be a violation of the Privacy Rule for a covered entity to refrain from providing
access to an individual’s protected health information, to the extent that doing so would
result in a disclosure of trade secrets.”).
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the integrity of the questions on a professional licensing exam. If a patient has
heard the test questions before and can “cheat” by already knowing the
answers, the patient’s care may be less effective—that is, if there are no other
indications of compromised mental state to which the skilled practitioner would
respond. This would be a concern, but not of the same type of concern as if
unquailed individuals were able to memorize questions to a medical licensing
exam and thereby be released on an unsuspecting public to provide inadequate
or even harmful medical treatment. In addition, the possibility that a patient
might cheat on the test by remembering the answers would not be of concern in
a clinical setting, at least not for cognitive mental testing. If a patient can
remember answers in that manner, it is likely that their cognitive function is
normal.
The notion that the secrecy required for MMSE and for professional
licensing exams might in any way be equivalent would be somewhat silly in
any event. The test has been used and distributed widely across time, with
much of its value coming from the fact that it has remained unchanged for so
long. Individual patients may even hear the test over and over again across
time.
In addition, suggesting that the information in the MMSE test constitutes a
trade secret is somewhat odd.106 To satisfy the secrecy requirement in trade
secret, one must ordinarily show that the protected information gives the owner
an advantage over competitors.107 The appropriate question is whether the test
itself is well known by competitors, which in this case would mean competitors
in the field of medicine. Given how widely the test is known, it would be
difficult to establish that it constitutes a trade secret, at least not in the way that
secrecy is ordinarily measured for the purposes of trade secret protection.
Limiting release of the test results is even more puzzling. One could
imagine PAR might argue that it is concerned about maintaining the quality
and reputation of its product by ensuring accurate interpretation. The
genuineness of any such concern might be called into doubt, however, by the
happy coincidences that could result from denying the release of data. If results
cannot be released without PARs permission to anyone who is not medically
trained, then medical researchers, in theory, cannot publish their results in
medical journals. Such journals are normally available to anyone willing to pay
a subscription or one-time access fee, regardless of whether that person has any
medical training at all, let alone training related to cognitive testing. It is
possible that in the future, PAR could require medical researchers to pay a
license fee or, better yet, to publish their result only through publications
operated by PAR. This approach could provide a lucrative revenue stream,

106. This issue has been explored by one of the authors in Robin Feldman, Intellectual
Property Wrongs, STANFORD J. L. BUS. & FIN. (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2127558.
107. Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). See also Am.
Paper & Packaging Products, Inc. v. Kirgan. 228 Cal. Rptr. 713 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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despite raising concerns about impeding the flow of medical research
VII.

ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

From an economic perspective, one might be concerned about a potential
mismatch between the reward that is being claimed by the MMSE copyright
holders and their contribution to the value of the MMSE. One could argue that
much of the value of the MMSE has been added by society, rather than by the
creators of the test. The reason the test is so valuable today relates in large part
to the extent of use throughout the medical field. Doctors in one hospital can
use the test to evaluate a patient’s progress or deterioration across time because
other doctors and hospitals that have treated the patient will have used the same
test. There is great value in comparing apples to apples. The same phenomenon
is true for medical research. When researchers are working with data across
time and in different settings, it is of enormous benefit if the data is collected
using the same basic test. This allows researchers to more easily aggregate
large numbers of studies and greater amounts of data. The advantages of
everyone using the same test can persuade users to stay with a particular test,
even if it is not the best test available. In fact, medical professionals have noted
that the test has drawbacks and weaknesses, but its ubiquitous influence makes
it the best option.108 As one article author noted, the MMSE stands out more
for its widespread use than for any special properties or for its clinical
uniqueness.109
Economists have described this type of phenomenon in terms of network
effects. With network effects, the fact that everyone is using a particular
approach can lead others to implement the same approach, even if better
options are available or become available.110 Network effects have been
discussed at length in the context of monopoly theory, particularly as a way of
understanding barriers for new entrants into a particular market and the
advantages of being the first mover in an area—advantages that are unrelated to

108. See, e.g., Kenneth Shulman, et. al, IPA Survey of Brief Cognitive Screening
Instruments, 18 INTN’L PSYCHOGERIATRICS 281 (2006) (survey reporting that while the
MMSE has become the lingua franca of cognitive screening, it has limitations related to
sensitivity, as well as cognitive biases with respect to education, culture, and language);
David Knopman, The Initial Recognition and Diagnosis of Dementia, 104 AM. J. MED. 2S
(1998) (noting that the MMSE is the most widely used quantitative mental status
examination in North America, but noting that its major drawback is lack of sensitivity for
detecting mild dementia).
109. J. Wesson Ashford, Screening for Memory Disorders, Dementia and Alzheimer’s
Disease, 4 AGING HEALTH 399, 402 (2008).
110. Although the economic and legal literature on network effects is voluminous, for a
classic discussion of network effects, see Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and
Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
940 (1986); see also Robin Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079
(1999) (describing how network effects can allow a monopolist to use leverage to strangle
next-generation substitutes in their infancy).
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quality of the product.
The importance of network effects has been analyzed in the context of
antitrust analysis, but it also has implications for Intellectual Property. From an
antitrust perspective, the questions may relate to the circumstances in which
different market power configurations can create incentives for companies to
engage in improper attempts to attain and maintain a monopoly. From an
intellectual property perspective, I suggest that the society should also consider
the extent to which the value of the intellectual property has been created by
the contributions of others and not by the contributions of the one claiming an
intellectual property interest. If intellectual property doctrines are designed in a
way that credits the full value to those claiming intellectual property, the law
has created a mismatch between the value contributed to society and the reward
that is offered as an incentive to create that value.
One could argue that if our goal is to offer incentives for creativity,
offering the possibility that one might receive a reward wildly beyond the value
of what one has actually created is certainly an incentive. That would be a
lottery-like system, in which the reward is based on luck and essentially
unrelated to contribution. In theory, one could argue further that creating
incentives for those who are able to harness or fool society into creating value
for them might be appropriate, although it seems far from the underlying
concepts of Intellectual Property.
Our current Intellectual Property system is far from perfect, and one could
argue that there is an element of luck involved in whether one can garner a
return from one’s creation. Nevertheless, conceptualizations of Intellectual
Property in general, and copyright in specific, do envision trying to create the
potential for a reward that flows from the contribution of the creator. Moreover,
our forays at the intersection of Intellectual Property and Antitrust suggest that
we are uninterested in allowing Intellectual Property rights holders to benefit
from using society’s contributions through networking effects.
In this section, we are talking about whether, and under what
circumstances, copyright doctrines should take into account the fact that a
particular work has become the de facto standard. In the context of Internet
standards, Pamela Samuelson has argued explicitly that given the exclusion of
systems from copyright protection, as well as the concepts of merger and
scenes a faire, standards should fall outside of copyright protection.111 Items
may be original enough in the first instance to be protectable but may lose that
protection as they become standards across time.112 There are also analogies
available in other areas of Intellectual Property law. For example, in trademark,
the holder of a trademark can lose rights in the mark through so-called
“genericide,” that is, if the trademark becomes the general term in the minds of

111. Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyright in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193

(2007).
112. See id. at 215-220 (discussing among others the case of Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc.,
124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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the public for that type of product, rather than referring to one particular
company making the product.113
Companies will go to great lengths to persuade the public not to use their
trademark as a generic term. Consider Xerox’s advertising campaign to tell
people that “You can’t Xerox a Xerox on a Xerox. But we don’t mind at all if
you copy a copy on a Xerox copier.” Xerox spent a lot of money on an
advertising campaign to tell people that you can “copy on a copier” but not
“Xerox.”114
The term genericide seems like a strange anomaly. If matricide is killing
one’s mother, and patricide is killing one’s father, then genericide should be
killing of the generic, rather than the killing of one’s trademark. Be that as it
may, genericide as a legal concept is deeply entrenched in Trademark law.
Some scholars have argued that the logic for genericide flows in part from the
notion that the Trademark holder should not profit from the labor of others
when the value of the work is attributable to the collective labor of the users,
rather than the work of the creator.115
The issue of trading off the labor of others has arisen in copyright itself. In
Lotus v. Borland, the court denied copyright protection to a user interface that
had become the de facto standard in the industry in part because of the
collective labor of its users.116 As noted in a concurring opinion, “it is hard to
see why customers who have learned the Lotus menu and devised macros for it
should remain captives of Lotus because of an investment in learning made by
the users, not by Lotus.” The MMSE case presents an even stronger case for
concerns about network effects. Users who wish to switch would not just be

113. See Samuelson, supra, note 111; see also Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the
Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1054, 11011102 (analogizing copyright case law on industry standards to trademark law’s doctrine of
genericide); 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.3.2.1, at 2:41 (citing the
Menell argument and discussing the point).
114. ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 894 (2012).
115. See id. at 898, Note on Genericide, Language, and Policing Costs; see also, Steven
Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1999).
116. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by
equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright,
in 1610 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 197 (Edward Elgar 2000) (noting that, “if
switching costs are high enough, giving copyright protection to a popular user interface that
has become an industry standard can extend the copyright owner’s monopoly into the
computer, not just the interface market); see also MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note
114 at 898, Note on Genericide, Language, and Policing Costs; Peter S. Menell, An Analysis
of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1054,
1066-1069. But see William H. Page and John E. Lopatka, Network Externalities in 760
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 970 (Edward Elgar 2000) (arguing that limiting
copyright protection for network externalities in the case of computer software could bleed
over into other areas of copyright, such as fan fiction, and that weakening copyright
protection allows greater competition by clones but reduces the payoff for innovators);
Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection of
Software, 24 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 321-377 (1995) (criticizing Lotus v. Borland).
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giving up their own time that has been invested in learning their test, but also
giving up the ability to speak the same language and therefore interact with
medical professionals across time regarding this patient and across research
data with other patients.
The analogy to trademarks that have become generic is useful from other
perspectives, beyond the notion of the shared labor of others. Additional logic
for loss of trademark status when the trademark becomes a generic term stems
from concern that others would be unable to compete on equal terms. If
competitors cannot use the words that have become standard in an industry,
how can they effectively compete? Translated into the context of medical
treatment, when copyright exists in the words that have become the standard of
medical care, how can any physician provide quality medical care without
those words?
It is important to note that becoming a de facto standard can affect rights in
the trademark circumstances above, even when the work has become the
industry standard through no fault of the creator. In fact, courts have found
genericide when the trademark holder actively policed the mark and worked to
dissuade adoption by the public.117 In other words, circumstances can arise in
which, through no fault of the creator, society so fully and heartily embraces
one’s work that the work is essentially wrenched from the bosom of the creator
and absorbed into the bosom of society itself.
Of course, a defense would be even more compelling if the Intellectual
Property rights holder actively induced adoption of their creation as the
industry standard while hiding their intention to claim rights for the proposed
standard. The extreme case arises in patent law, in which formal standard
setting bodies may require that those who are participating disclose whether
they have potential patent rights related to the technology being considered as a
standard. The law has not looked kindly on patent holders who engage in
deceptive practices such as advocating for a particular technological standard
without revealing their patent position to other members.118
The MMSE facts are nowhere near as extreme as those involving
misrepresentations to formal standards bodies in patent law. Nevertheless, the
specific circumstances involved in the MMSE are distinct from those in which
no fault can be attributed to the creator, and other legal issues within copyright
are likely to come into play. In particular, courts have held that copyright
holders may not recover for infringement if they have aided or induced the
infringement, including by silence or inaction.119 This is known as equitable
117. See, e.g., Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d. 75 (2d Cir.
1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 91936 (finding genericide despite extensive efforts to
police the mark).
118. See In re Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302 (Fed. Trade Comm’n, Aug. 2, 2006),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/060802commissionopinion.pdf.
119. Quinn v. City of Detroit, 23 F. Supp. 2d 741, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1998). See Nimmer
on Copyright § 13.07; see also Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115-16 (D. Nev.
2006) (noting that principles of estoppel apply to copyright infringement actions).
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estoppel, a doctrine that prevents copyright holders from enforcing their rights.
The general doctrine of equitable estoppel requires that an accused infringer
demonstrate that the person asserting copyright engaged in certain overt
acts.120 However, even if a copyright holder did not engage in such overt acts,
estoppel may arise through silence or inaction, particularly if the silence is
prolonged.121 In addition, a copyright owner’s acquiescence in infringement
may, if accompanied by overt acts and continued over a sufficient period of
time, result in abandonment of copyright.122 In this situation, abandonment
constitutes a defense to infringement even after the former copyright owner’s
acquiescence has ceased:
If the facts show that there was nothing to indicate to [the accused infringers]
that they were unauthorized to use the copyrighted work, and if they
reasonably relied on that state of affairs to their detriment, then the result is to
defeat plaintiff’s cause of action entirely, for the future as well as for past
conduct.123

In addition to equitable estoppel, those asserting copyright in the MMSE
may find that their action is barred through laches, a doctrine that prevents
plaintiff’s from bringing an action if they have waited an unreasonable length
of time before coming to court.124 As the renowned Judge Learned Hand noted,
“it is inequitable for the owner of a copyright, with full notice of an intended
infringement, to stand inactive . . . and to intervene only when his speculation
has proved a success.”125 Laches is commonly described as preventing rights
holders from sleeping on their rights.
The modern courts are split on the question of whether laches is a viable
defense to copyright infringement. The Ninth Circuit has recently upheld
laches as a defense to infringement,126 while the Fourth Circuit has expressly

120. The accused infringer must show that: (a) plaintiff knew of the accused infringer’s
allegedly infringing conduct; (b) plaintiff intended that the accused infringer rely upon his
conduct or acted so that defendant had a right to believe it was so intended; (c) the accused
infringer was ignorant of the true facts; and (d) the accused infringer detrimentally relied on
plaintiff’s conduct. See Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 453 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing
Nimmer § 13.07); Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960).
121. See id. (estoppel may be raised by silence or inaction); DeCarlo v. Archie Comic
Publ’ns, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 497, 509 n.65, 511 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 11 Fed. Appx. 26 (2d
Cir. 2003) (finding estoppel by virtue of “silence throughout decades of ACP’s use of the
characters”).
122. See Kraft v. Cohen, 32 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Pa. 1940), rev’d on other grounds, 117
F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1941); Nimmer on Copyright § 13.06.
123. Keane Dealer Servs, Inc. v. Harts, 968 F. Supp. 944, 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
124. See Haas v. Leo Feist, 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (citing Second Circuit
laches opinion and finding delay despite notice a viable defense to a claim of copyright
infringement).
125. Id. See also Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir.
1947); Blackburn v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 14 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Cal. 1936).
126. See Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff failed to
complain of defendant’s exploitation of James Bond character up to 36 years). See Nimmer
on Copyright § 12.06[1].
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rejected it.127 The Supreme Court has not considered the issue.
The MMSE would be a good case for application of equitable estoppel—
that is, through silence or even through direct encouragement, allowing users to
develop an expectation and to rely on the expectation that the tests would be
freely available—and laches—that is, waiting too long to exercise one’s rights.
The MMSE was first published in 1975, and copyright was not asserted until
the copyright was transferred twenty-five years later.128 In the interim, the
MMSE was widely distributed in textbooks, pocket guides, and web sites,
becoming the de facto standard for cognitive screening.129 In fact, twenty-five
years after publication of the MMSE one of the authors of the test wrote that,
“[o]ne possible reason for [its] popularity is that it is free.”130
It is likely that the authors, as proud parents often do, put forward their best
efforts to circulate their work and convince society to embrace their test as the
standard approach. Even without such efforts, silence in the face of widespread
adoption of the test across decades allowed health care professionals to form
the reasonable expectation that the test would be freely available. When the
creator of a work has allowed a belief to develop that others may freely use the
work, the creator cannot later decide that widespread adaptation of the work is
a fortuitous way to make money. Application of these doctrines is even more
appropriate when the work has become an industry standard.
This logic is particularly important in light of the brave new world of
monetization. In copyright as well as in patents, rights are being systematically
stripped from any underlying product, grouped and repackaged, and then traded
much like a commodity. As a result, large numbers of rights, that would not
have garnered any direct return in the past, now appear on the market in the
form of commoditized, tradable rights. The cost of testing these rights in court,
combined with the possibility of large penalties, and uncertainties in
intellectual property law allow those asserting such rights to obtain returns far
above the value that the intellectual property could contribute to any tangible
product.131

127. See Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir.

2001).
128. See Marshal F. Folstein, Susan Folstein, & Paul R. McHugh, “Mini-mental state”:
A practical method for grading the cognitive state of patients for the clinician, 12 J.
PSYCHOL. RES. 189-98 (1975).
129. See John C. Newman & Robin Feldman, Copyright and Open Access at the
Bedside, 365 N. Engl. J. Med. 2447-49 (2011).
130. Marshal F. Folstein, The Birth of the MMS, 2 THIS WEEK’S CITATION CLASSIC 18
(Jan. 8, 1990); see also Wesson, supra note 109 (discussing the history of the MMSE and its
comparison to other tests, as well as citing Folstein’s “Birth of the MMS” article).
131. For an in-depth exploration of monetization in copyright and patent and a
discussion of how rights can be used to extract economic rents above a reasonable return on
investment, see Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, STAN. J.L. BUS & FIN.
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2127558; see
also Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects of
Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357 (2012)
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In this context, arbitrageurs are searching for old rights that can be revived
and asserted against successful products on the market. The problem is bad
enough in patents, where the rights last for two decades. In copyright, where
the rights can continue to haunt us for more than a hundred years, the prospect
of resurrection of old rights is particularly troubling. In this environment,
courts must be vigilant in preventing parties from discarding direct or indirect
permission obligations merely by transferring the right.
CONCLUSION
Attempts to assert copyright in cognitive medical testing should be rejected
by the courts that eventually face the issue. When a medical test consists of
nothing but words, asserting copyright in those words serves as a back door
approach for using copyright to gain control of a process—something that is
the proper purview of patent law, rather than copyright. The logic would apply
in all such testing, but the assertion of copyright in the Mini-Mental State
Exam, is particularly inappropriate. Much of the value of the test flows from its
adaptation as an industry standard, rather than the labor of the authors. In
addition, the fact that the authors permitted the work to be used freely for
decades has created the expectation in users that work would be freely
available and has encouraged its adoption as the industry standard. After
standing silent for decades, the authors cannot now decide that the test provides
a convenient vehicle for monetization.
Undoubtedly, this issue will make its way to the steps of the courthouse
sometime soon. We hope that the judges who are faced with these decisions
will recognize that attempted assertion of copyrights in this context is a
distortion of the logic underlying both patent and copyright. Equally important,
these copyright assertions threaten to harm both medical research and the
delivery of medical care for everyone.

(available at http://dltr.law.duke.edu/2012/11/30/the-america-invents-act-500-effects-ofpatent-monetization-entities-on-us-litigation/); Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants
Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1.
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APPENDIX A
Sample of Cognitive Assessment Tools for Which Copyright Has Been
Claimed132
Tool

Common
abbreviation
Cognitive assessment
Mini Mental
MMSE
State
Examination

First
publication

Notes

[1]

Montreal
Cognitive
Assessment

MoCA

[2]

St. Louis
University
Mental Status
examination
Mini-cog
Confusion
Assessment
Method

SLUMS

[3]

Copyright registered to authors.
Exclusive license from authors to
PAR, no use without permission. See:
http://www4.parinc.com/WebUploads/
StaticPages/PhotocopyingTestMaterial
s.pdf
Copyright registered to author.
Generally free to use and distribute for
clinical and education use, permission
required for commercial use. See:
http://mocatest.org/permission.html
Public domain according to author (J.
Newman, personal communication)

Mini-cog
CAM

[4]
[5]

Short Portable
Mental Status
Questionnaire
General
Practitioner
Assessment of
Cognition
Sweet 16

SPMSQ

[6]

GPCOG

[7]

Sweet 16

[8]

Copyright registered to author.
Copyright registered to author.
Generally free to use for clinical or
research purposes with
acknowledgement, permission required
for publication. See:
http://www.hospitalelderlifeprogram.or
g/pdf/TheConfusionAssessmentMetho
d.pdf
Permission required for any use. See:
http://ericpfeiffermd.com/spmsq/
Generally free for clinical or research
use, permission required for
commercial use of publication. See:
http://www.gpcog.com.au/faq.php
Copyright registered to author.
Generally free for clinical or research
use, permission required for
commercial use. Not currently

132. This appendix is simply an illustrative list of tools known to the authors for which
copyright claims are indicated, either by a licensing program or by placement of the test in
the public domain—an indication of belief that potential copyright claims might exist.
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available.

Mood assessment
Geriatric
GDS
Depression
Screen
Patient Health
Questionnaire

PHQ, PHQ2, PHQ-9

Functional assessment
Eastern
ECOG
Cooperative
Oncology
Group toxicity
criteria
Instrumental
IADLs
Activities of
Daily Living

[9]

[10]

Placed in public domain by authors.
See:
http://www.stanford.edu/~yesavage/G
DS.html
Placed in public domain by authors.
See:
http://www.phqscreeners.com/instructi
ons/instructions.pdf

[11]

Placed in public domain by authors.
See:
http://ecog.dfci.harvard.edu/general/pe
rf_stat.html

[12]

Generally free to use or distribute with
attribution. See:
http://www.abramsoncenter.org/pri/sca
les.htm
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